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explai_N INDIVIDUal IDeNtity 
IN NetwoRks 
JOHN B. DaVIS* 1 
Previously I examined the standard preference-based conception of the 
atomistic individual in neoclassical economics [Davis (2003c)], and 
argued that this conception fails two basic identity tests that are reaso-
nable to require of any viable conception of the individual as an inde-
pendent economic agent. From a different perspective, namely, the l970s 
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu (SMDJ results, it has been shown that the 
neoclassical conception of the atomistic individual is problematic in that 
;, Univ~rsity of Amsterdam llnd \larq11ette Uni\·ersity· j h dl!''isCauya ni· john dí!\·js@m¡Jrqucllr edu 
l. The nmhor is ~r:ueful for helplul comments un un t"arly \'BSIOO ol th is p;tpcr h} .\than Bom it-r, l-lans 
Bemard Schmid, :.md J ¡le k \'romeo. The author is 11lso ~n.nelnl for cnmmems frnm sess1on partic:ipomts .u th.: 
20()) Europeon Association for E,·olutionur~ Political Economy meetings in ~laastriL:ht and the 2004 
European Society for the History of Economics meetings in Treviso. Errors Jre the a11thor's alone. 
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it cannot support the standard microfoundations explanation of aggre-
gate economic behavior in markets, such as is employed in comparative 
static analysis [Kirman (1989); Rizvi (1994)) . One consequence of the 
latter development has been a number of efforts to re-conceptualize indi-
vidual economic agents as actively interacting with one another, rather 
than as simply responding indirectly and passively to one another through 
the mechanism of the price system. One new research programme which 
does this investigares economies as complex adaptive systems in which 
aggregate and individual economic behavior are mutually influencing, 
unlike in Walrasian, methodological individualist models which rather 
sum across independent individuals as a means of explaining aggregate 
market behavior as fully a product of individual behavior. At the same 
time, in contrast to most game theory models in which interaction tends 
to be pervasive in the sense that players need to know each other's (likely) 
strategies, this research programme understands individual interaction 
to be limited in scope in that individuals only interact with select sets of 
individuals, or individuals interact in local nerworks or neighborhoods 
that are subsets of larger economies. In the limit, this more narrow sort 
of interaction might be pairwise, as in Alan Kirman's analysis of loyalty 
relationships between individual buyers and sellers in the Marseille fish 
market, which shows how a market can exhibir simple aggregate pro-
perties (such as down-sloping demand) without individuals also exhibi-
ting the same type of behavior [Kirman (200 1)]. 
One challenge that this research programme faces is whether it can 
develop an explanation of individual behavior underlying individual inter-
action and the observed aggregate properties of markets. lndeed, if the 
standard neoclassical conception of the independent individual no lon-
ger applies, and if aggregate properties of markets can be explained in 
terms of individual interaction, then can it still be said that individuals 
are distinct economic agents, or should we conclude that groups of indi-
viduals in networks are the relevant economic agents? Of course not only 
has economics historically made explanation of individual behavior cen-
tral, but one also seems to presuppose that individuals are distinct eco-
nomic agents when one asserts that individuals interact. So this question 
might be better re-phrased to ask whether the particular conception of 
the individual interacting with other individuals in networks can still be 
said to satisfy basic identity tests that may be reasonably required of any 
conception of the individual as a distinct economic agents. The two tests 
that l have previously applied to the neoclassical conception are (i) the 
individuation test lwhether individuals in a given conception can be 
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shown to be distinct and independenr of one another) and (ii) the re-
identification test (whether individuals shown to be distinct when iden-
tified in sorne way can be re-identified in that same way across a process 
of change that may alter many of their other characteristics). These two 
tests are meant to capture how individual economic agents can be said to 
ha ve the equivalent in economic analysis of what philosophers refer to as 
personal identity, though 1 emphasize only a 'personal identity' with res-
pect to economic life and not life as a whole. Personal identity concepts, 
it should be added, are different than social identity concepts. The laner 
generally concern how individuals identify themselves with others in 
social groups or simply with social groups. Thus, while individuals in 
loyalty relationships may be said to idenrify with those to whom they are 
loyal, the question 1 rather attempt to address here is whether in identi-
fying with others they nonetheless still sustain personal identities as dis-
tinct individuals. The motivation for this question is a general concern 
with establishing the types of agents appropriate to economic analysis. 
Thus 1 proceed by asking a skeptical question: were there not a way to 
understand how individuals retain a status as distinct agents, might it not 
be better for economics to regard groups as economic agents, and give 
up its long-standing attention to individuals? 
In rhis paper 1 apply both the individuation and re-identification tests 
to the conception of the individual implicit in Kirman's account of the 
Marseille fish market taken as representative of network analysis, and 
then argue that, in contrast to the standard atomistic conception of the 
individual in neoclassical economics, the network conception can be 
understood to employ a viable conception of distinct, re-identifiable indi-
viduals. Thus 1 answer m y skeptical question in favor of economics main-
taining attention to individuals, though not on the traditional, 
methodological individualist view of individuals. 1 take this to be impor-
tant both for thinking about individuals in economics, and for unders-
tanding networks as economic systems in which individual and aggregate 
behavior is mutually influencing, where this means employing a more 
complex account of economic agency than is curren ti y available in either 
individualist or holist frameworks. That is, whereas traditional indivi-
dualist frameworks too often assume that only individuals are agents and 
holist frameworks too often assume that only groups of individuals are 
agents, in the network conception both individuals and groups of indivi-
duals exercise agency, and moreover do so in a mutually i~fluencing man-
ner. This richer view of agency, it is hoped, will offer points of tangency 
with parallel reasoning in contemporary economic sociology. 
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The first section of the paper sets out a rationale for identity analysis 
of individuals in terms of an analogous relation between personal iden-
tity arguments in philosophy and the fixed-point approach to equilibrium 
existence proofs in economics. Here 1 attempt to set forth a view of per-
sonal identity appropriate to economic analysis that perhaps departs in 
one key respect from thinking about personal identity investigated by 
many philosophers. The second section of the paper turns to Kirman's 
Marseille fish market analysis as a paradigm example of the network 
conception ro describe individual behavior in terms of loyalty relation-
ships that develop between individual buyers and sellers. An important 
issue his approach raises is, how are we to understand the behavior asso-
ciated with the reinforcement mechanism he employs to explain loyalty 
in his simulation analysis? The third section applies Margaret Gilbert's 
philosophical account of loyalty behavior between pairs of individuals 
developed in terms of the idea of collective or shared intentions rather 
than individual intentions. Central to this account is that shared inten-
tions depend on individuals forming joint commitments to one another 
rhat may conflict with their individual goals. The fourth section applies 
this collective intentionality analysis to the nerwork conception of indi-
viduals to explain interactive individual behavior. This section argues 
that both the individuation and re-identification tests necessary to an 
identity analysis demonstration that such individuals exist can be said to 
be satisfied. The fifth and last section briefly condudes by returning to 
the analogy between personal identity arguments in philosophy and equi-
librium existence proofs in economics and the position taken in the paper 
that establishing the eXistence of individuals and existence of equilibrium 
are conjoint projects. 
I. Parallels between Fixed point theorerns and 
personal identity analysis2 
Fixed point theorems constitute the primary method employed in eco-
nomics for establishing the existence of solutions to equilibrium systems 
of equations or inequalities [Giocoli (2003 )]. Brouwer-Kakutani-type 
fixed point theorems have been used to demonstrate the existence of a 
set of equilibrium prices for a Walrasian competitive economy and the 
2. This argument is ~lso ad\anced in Do~vis 12003b). 
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existence of an equilibrium point of n-tuple strategies in a many-person 
non-cooperative game. 3 A fixed point theorem is a mathematical propo-
sition which states that a mapping f that transforms each point x of a set 
X toa point f(x) within X has a fixed point x· that is transformed to itsclf, 
so that f(x') = x'. Thus a fixed point theorem demonstrates the existence 
of sorne system of relationships by anchoring that system in one self-iden-
tical relati'onship within that system. This bears important resemblances 
to the logic employed in much philosophical personal identity analysis to 
establish the existence of a person in terms of one unchanged or sclf-
identical characteristic amidst change in other characteristics of the per-
son. The mapping f that transforms each point x of a set X to a point f(x) 
within X can be understood as sorne process of change in the person 
understood in terms of a set of that person's characteristics X. The fixed 
point x· that is transformed to itself, so that f(x') = x', can be understood 
as that unchanging or self-identical characteristic of the person that allows 
us to say that the person exists despite change in other characteristics. 
From this perspective, philosophical personal identity analysis that 
focuses on personal continuity by re-identifying the individual in sorne 
way is a form of existence analysis, and philosophical theories that aim to 
demonstrate personal identity could be said aim to demonstrate the exis-
tence of the person much as fixed point theorems aim to demonstrate the 
existence of an equilibrium set of prices or n-tuple strategies. The sug-
gests two conclusions, the first pertaining to economics and the second 
to philosophy. 
First, if we are to say, based on the application of fixed point theo-
rems, that an economy exists when represented as a system of equations, 
then extending that same fixed point logic to the personal identity of eco-
nomic agents requires that we also demonstrate that the agents in that 
economy exist when represented in terms of collections of characteris-
tics. That is, contrary to standard thinking in economics, economic equi-
librium depends not just upon demonstrating the existence of a set of 
equilibrium prices oran equilibrium point of n-tuple strategies, but also 
on demonstrating the existence of market agents themselves. Note, then, 
that on the standard neoclassical conception of the individual, while non-
identity preserving change occurs in one set of individual characteristics 
as individual pre-trade endowments are transformed into post-trade com-
modities the individual holds, the individual's preferences- which are 
3. Also see Leonurd 1 !9'121lorJohn \"on :-o:eum11nn's originnl upplicnrion of tixed point methods ro gnmes. 
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normally taken as unchanging - can be construed as that particular cha-
racteristic of the individual which acts as a self-identical fixed point assu-
ring the individual's existence. While 1 have argued that this implicit 
account of personal identity is not successful, nonetheless it may be 
construed as offering such an account (Da vis {2003c), chap. 3 ], thus crea-
ting the paralld between existence proofs and identity arguments in eco-
nomics. 
Second, the comparison between· fixed point theorems and personal 
identity analysis offers an important insight into how we might think 
about the latter in economics. To say that a fixed point x· is transformed 
to itsdf, or that f(x·) = x· , is to characterize x· in sdf-identical, reflexive 
terms. That is, in all transformations, x· always reproduces itself and only 
itself. Thus a personal identity analysis understood specifically in fixed 
point terms would explain the existence of the person or individual in 
terms of one specific type of characteristic, namely, one exhibiting reflexi-
vity. Put somewhat differently, what would be unchanging about indivi-
dual economic agents amidst change in their other characteristics is a 
characteristic of individuals that exhibits their self-reference. Much exis-
ting personal identity analysis in philosophy, however, ignores reflexivity 
and self-reference, and simply focuses on various individual characteris-
tics that might be thought to be unchanging, for example, such as that a 
person might always have psychological continuity. Applying fixed point 
thinking to the identity of individual economic agents, however, leads us 
to rather interpret unchangingness specifically in reflexive terms. Thus, 
to make use of this different perspective, 1 apply it in the conclusion to 
section four in which collective intentionality analysis is applied to the 
Kirman's network conception of the individual. 
II. Complex Economic Networks: Kirman's 
Marseille Fish Market Analysis 
Complexity in economics can be defined in the broadest sense in terms 
of economic systems in which endogenous processes do not lead asymp-
totically to fixed points, limit cycles, or explosions (Day (1994)]. A nar-
rower view of economics complexity may be set forth in terms of the 
following [Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane (1997); cf. Rosser (2004)]: (1) dis-
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persed interaction among heterogeneous agents acting locally; (2) no glo-
bal controller able to exploit all opportunities or interactions in the eco-
nomy; (3) cross-cutting hierarchical organization with tangled 
inteructions; (4) continua! adaptation by learning and evolving agents; 
(5) perpetua! novelty with new markets, technologies, behaviors, institu-
tions that create new niches in the ecology of economic systems; (6) out-
of-equilibrium dynamics with zero or many equilibria and the system 
unlikely to be near a global optimum. Economic networks, finally, are 
one type of complex economic system based on this narrower type of 
view. 
Economic networks have been investigated by both economists und 
economic sociologists [cf. Rauch and Casella (2001)], and though they 
understand networks in different ways, broadly speaking economic net-
works, or the "network form of organization," may be defined as "any 
collection of actors (N~2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange rela-
tions with one unother and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organiza-
tional authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during 
the exchange" [Podolny and Page (1998), p. 59]. Economic networks 
m ay also be classified in various ways, such as whether they involve concen-
trated or patterned forms of exchange [Zuckerman (2003), p. 551]. 
Generally, however, networks are seen as a departure from atomistic tra-
ding relationships in that individuals show a preference for trading with 
certain other individuals rather than engaging in arm's length type of 
trade characteristic of comperitive markets. From a price theory point of 
view, this difference is significant in that it generates distinct patterns of 
trade, prices, and other economic variables different from what it holds 
for competitive markets. 
1 treat Kirman's Marseille fish market analysis as a paradigm example 
of the economic network, concentruted exchange conception, because 
of its focus on minimal interaction in the form of pairwise combinations 
of individual buyers and sellers.4 The analysis is also valuable in virtue of 
its empirical foundation in extensive evidence regarding buyer-seller 
interactions over a period of time.~ In addition, the fish market case repre-
4. Albnn Bouvier comments that one might focus on 'local exchange S) stems' in which certain communities 
play a central role in loyal trade relutionships. For example. in Marseille and elsewhere the l\lonrid commu-
nity !Muslim Senegalesel play such a role. One advnntage of this appronch is that it pinces indi,·iduuls in an 
historical community, ond thus deepens the analysis of their moti\'es. ~ly discussion. howe\·er. is rr-stricted to 
the case of individnals not apparently attached to such communities. 
~- The data nm from.Januury !, 1988 to.Jnne 30, 1991, and include a total of 237,162 transuctions between 
buyers and sellen. 
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sents an especially simple market type in that with a perishable product 
there are essentially no stocks to carry over from one da y to the next, so 
that the basic mechanics of the market and their results can be isolated 
and effectively frozen ata point in time.b Finally, the market application 
itself is particularly important as a framework in which to examine the 
network conception of interactive individuals since clearly individuals in 
markets are relatively autonomous, whereas it can be argued that indivi-
duals in !iOcial groups such as firms and households are submerged in an 
interaction with one another that makes the group the relevant agent. 
Thus the market setting arguably provides an ideal framework for asses-
sing whether network interaction offers a new way of understanding indi-
viduals that is alternative to the standard atomistic conception. 
What, then, are Kirman's main results? First, the evidence marshalled 
from the Marseille market is inconsistent with the idea that the "beha-
vior one observes in the aggregate in such markets corresponds to sorne 
enlarged version of the behavior of the individual in the classical compe-
titive market" [Kirman (2001 ), p . 159).7 Second, while down-sloping 
demand curves obtain for individual kinds of fish at the aggregate leve!, 
these markets are organized in such a way that considerable price dis-
persion precludes their being regarded as 'single price' type competitive 
markets [Hiirdle and Kirman, (1995)]. This distribution in prices can be 
explained by a process in which individual traders strike bargains among 
themselves that permit sellers to discriminare between buyers, with suc-
cessive prices being charged for the same kind of fish to different buyers 
differing by as muchas 30 percent [Kirman and Vignes (1991)) . Does 
the market, thus understood, exhibir equilibrium characteristics? Since 
tests for the stability of the resulting price distribution turn out to exhi-
bir a high degree of constancy over time [Hardle and Kirman (1995)] , it 
seems fair to say that the market does achieve sorne sort of equilibrium, 
if not one that is characterizable in classical competitive terms. 
How, then, does the market actually get organized? What was obser-
ved in the pattern of trading r~lationships in the Marseille market is that 
"On the one hand, there are buyers who regularly huy from the same sel-
ler and are extremely loyal, and on the other hand, there are people who 
shift between sellers all the time" [Kirman (2001) , p. 177]. Since indivi-
duals who participare in such trading relationships appear not to behave 
ó. TI>is additionully ullows chunges in supply 10 be considertd the outcnme of a stochuslic process. 
l . This hud been thenreticully demonstruted in the SMD results [Kirman 119891). 
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as optimizing agents, at least in the standard way, Kirman propases rhat 
we say individuals use simple rules ro make their choices, and rhat tra-
ding relationships then emerge from a random marching process rhut 
operares between buyers and sellers who are aware of each others' iJen-
tities. This situarían was subsequently modeled in such a way asto simu-
lare buyers developing relationships with sellers on the basis of previous 
experience, where their probability of re-visiting sellers depends on pro-
fit received from past visits [Kirman and Vriend (2000); Weisbuch, 
Kirman, and Herreiner (2000)]. The framework employedinvolves a type 
of leaming process known as reinforcement leaming commonly u sed by 
psychologists and evolutionary and experimental economists. 8 Basically 
what rhe modeling shows is that the stronger the reinforcement mecha-
nism or parameter, all other things equal, the more likely it is that buyer-
seller loyalty relationships will emerge. 
One interesting aspect of buyer-seller loyalty relationships Kirman 
emphasizes is that the behavior of the class of buyers is highly bimodal: 
they either remain quite loyal to particular sellers or they continually visir 
many sellers. 9 lt also turns out that 90 percent of both buyers and sellers 
get a higher profit when dealing with their loyal counterparts. This is 
interesting in that loyal buyers pay higher prices than those that visit 
many sellers. But loyai· buyers still earn higher profits, beca use sellers 
learn to give them priority in service.10 As loyal sellers earn higher profit, 
then, the market does not function as a zero sum game. As the volume of 
transactions that goes through loyalty networks increases, the returns to 
the participants increases. We might take this to reflect the idea that the 
relation between the individual leve! and the market leve! is complex, 
where in contrast to the standard W alrasian strategy of aggregating across 
independent individuals, the way in which the market is organized 
mediares and complicares this relationship. The modeling strategy des-
cribed ubove provides one view of this complexity in its reliance on lear-
ning and reinforcement as dynamic, endogenous processes that generare 
loyalty matching. In the following section, 1 attempt to go behind this 
reinforcement mechanism analysis to explain how buyer-seller loyalty 
relationships might be understood in terms of individuals forming sha-
red intentions regarding loyal trade. 
8. Soe Kirman (ClOOIJ, pp. 178-179) lor refercnces. 
9. E.g .• 4H percent of al buyers bought 95 percent of th<ir cod from one seller. 
lO. Buyers earn profits on re-s;~le. 
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III. Collective intentionality analysis and 
complex individual behavior 
Collective intentionalíty analysis examines first person plural intentions 
(that the individual expresses in 'we' language) as opposed to the more 
traditionally investigated first person singular intentions (that the indivi-
dual expresses in 'I' language). What sets the former apart from the lar-
ter is their stronger success conditions. While individuals can express 
first person singular intentions in a relatively autonomous manner, being 
constrained mostly by the need to only communicate effectively, an indi-
vidual's first person plural intentions implicare others to whom the 'we' 
applíes, and are thus additionally constrained by the requirement that 
these other individuals in sorne manner agree to the content of the indi-
vidual's we-intention. Thus, following the widely accepted analysis of 
conventions [Lewis (1969)], we-intentions have been explained by sorne 
contributors as iterated sets of reciproca! attitudes between individuals 
who are said to share a given we-intention [Tuomela (1995)]. When an 
individual expresses a we-intention she generally believes that those other 
individuals to whom her expressed 'we' assertion applies would largely 
agree with her assertion. But she also believes that they believe she believes 
this, that they believe she believes that they believe this, etc., so that the 
reciproca! attitudes in question across the individuals concemed consti-
tute an iterative, many-layered set of reciproca! attitudes, such as are 
employed in game theory's common knowledge assumption. 11 
lt is important to emphasize that collective intentionality analysis is 
'individualístic' in the sense that individuals have we-intentions rather 
than groups of individuals, so that any reference toa 'group intention' is 
merely a shorthand way of referring to a structure of reciproca! attitudes 
across separare individuals who happen to share and agree to sorne we-
intention. Strictly speaking, only individuals have intentions. Different 
individuals, of course, can express the same we-intention, but in each 
instance that shared intention is decomposable into a set of reciproca! 
individual intentions. Note, then, that while the scope of 1-intentions is 
basically the independent individual, that is, the single individual's own 
plans, even if they apply to others, the scope of we-intentions is those 
plans that the individual shares with other individuals. We might ucear-
11. 1 put usid~ non-typicol cases of cleceitful use of 'wc'languoge and expression of u·e ·intentions. 1 olso ignore 
\\'heth~r this fommhnion products infinite regress problems. 
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dingly say that whereas an older holistic type of reasoning tends to explain 
individuals as social beings by subsuming individuals in social relation-
ships, collective intentionality analysis rather explains individuals as social 
beings by subsuming social relationships in individuals. 
A fair question is how does the treatment of individuals in collective 
intentionality analysis differ from rheir treatment in traditional econo-
mics thinking about individuals. Thus on sorne especially strong metho-
dological individualist interpretations of the latter individuals alone real! y 
exist and social groups are regarded as constructions or mere concepts. 12 
But other views of the individual in economics either allow that non-indi-
vidual, group-type agents exist - such as firms, unions, households, 
governments whose behavior does not need to be decomposed into or 
reduced to the behavior of their members - or are agnostic about whe-
ther individuals alone exist. Similarly, contributors to collective intentio-
nality analysis vary in their views from supposing only jndividuals exist 
to allowing that social groups exist as well. In this paper 1 seek to put 
these ontological issues aside in order to provide an account of the indi-
vidual alternative to the standard one in economics that sees individuals 
as always concerned strictly with their own welfare. The paper conse-
quently asks whether network analysis may be interpreted to include a 
conception of individuals as distinct and re-identifiable, irrespective of 
whether pairs of individuals in loyalty relations also constitute supra-indi-
vidual agents. My own view happens to be that both groups of indivi-
duals and single individuals can be economic agents, but 1 do not pursue 
this matter here. 
Of the recent contributors to collective intentionality analysis, in this 
paper 1 draw on Gilbert who has focused on pairwise shared intentions 
as one paradigm case [Gilbert ( 1989), 1996)]. 13 One of Gilbert's favorite 
exa~ples is of two individuals going for a walk together. On the one 
hand, it is odd to treat only two individuals as akin to a group. lndeed 
there are important differences between pairs of individuals forming sha-
red intentions and the way that shared intentions are formed in groups 
of many individuals. But on the other hand, the two-individual case clearly 
exhibits how individuals can share non-personal intentions- a matter 
central to their importance. Moreover, the small-scale, informal nature 
of the case can be compared to the scale of interaction involved in the 
12. "Society, alter oU, is jusi o convenient labd for the totality of indi\'iduals" [Arrou·ll98-ll, p. 80]. 
13 . For R collecth•c intenrionality bibliography. ~ hup·/ /uyu• belsjnki ti/%7Epyljkgsk/collim/. f'or a dif. 
ferent opplicolion of collecth·e intentionulity analysis,..., Dads 1200lol. 
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matching process Kirman uses to model buyers and sellers in the fish 
market. Whereas social interaction is often explained by sociologists and 
others in conncction with enduring social groups possessing complex 
forms of organization understood in terms of institutions and norms, in 
this instance we have social interaction that may be seen as elementary 
and informal in natute. Might two individuals, then. find themselves on 
a walk together by accident, that is, unintentionally? Gilbert thinks not, 
and explains the case of two individuals taking a walk together by saying 
that a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be a walk they take toge-
ther is that it be common knowledge between them that they each intend 
to take a walk together, where this common knowledge concems a sha-
red goal, and where their having this shared goal entitles us to regard the 
two separare individuals as a "plural subject" [Gilbert (1996), p. 179]. 
This plural subject is nonetheless still made up out of two distinct indi-
viduals who are linked together only with respect to whatever particular 
shared we-intentions they happen to have. 
It is important to emphasize that Gilbert supposes that two people 
may constitute a plural subject with a shared goal without each indivi-
dual also having that goal as a personal goal. H That is, an individual may 
be attached toa shared goal that is not necessarily in the individual's own 
goal or interest. What this possible tension between individual and sha-
red goals brings out is that individual involvement in a plural subject and 
shared goals is founded on the formation of a joint commitment. In other 
words, when two individuals' personal goals may be at odds with their 
shared goals, each must be committed - jointly committed - to sustai-
ning the latter vis-a-vis the former. Commitment thus understood is a 
normative concept in that it includes an idea of obligation, though as 
commitments themselves vary in character, so joint commitments can 
vary in character from the moral to the pragmatic. Thus in sorne cases 
having a joint commitment can imply that individuals have moral rights 
and obligations stemming from their shared goals, while in other cases 
having a joint commitment can simply be based on prudential or prag-
matic considerations without any moral connotation. Ordinary expe-
rience, of course, is often ambiguous in this respect, and indeed so much 
so that individuals with shared commitments may disagree asto whether 
their basis is moral or prudential. Similarly, apart from the question of 
their basis, the degree of bindingness individuals perceive to attach to 
14. E.g., '" \\·~ may. as a body. accept the goal of impro,•ing our depurlmenl's sturus in th.: unh·enily, without 
each of us hu,·ing the imprO\·ement uf our departm~nfs status as o1 pe11i0011l goal" [Gilbert 11996), p. 2 . 
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shared commitments can also vary. But in any event Gilbert seems to be 
right in saying that shared goals involve commitment and sorne form of 
obligation. 1 take this difference between shared goals and personal goals 
to be especially important for thinking about behavior in economics, 
because it shows us how individual behavior in circumstances of shared 
intentionality has a non-instrumental or, we might say, deontological cha-
racter in contrast to standard treatment of individual behavior in econo-
mics where individuals are seen to act exclusively in instrumental terms. 
Suppose, then, that individual behavior in economic life is understood 
both instrumentally, or in terms of individual goals, and deontologically, 
or in terms of individuals' shared goals, and that the balance between 
these two types of behavior is seen to be determined empirically in terms 
of the extent of each of these types of goals and behavior in the sum total 
of individual activities. One way this might be captured is by determi-
ning the extent to which 1-intentions and we-intentions are expressed in 
normal speech in different spheres of activity. This would then be a way 
of treating individual behavior as complex in not being subject toa single 
type of explanation, but rather as alternately employing incommensu-
. rabie sorts of decision-making procedures according to relevant circum-
stances. In terms of trading relationships involving concentra red exchange 
as in the Marseille fish market, individual behavior, then, might be cha-
racterized as complex in that individuals act instrumentally in circum-
stances in which they move from seller to seller, but deontologically when 
loyalty dictates repeated transactions with particular sellers. The lear-
ning-reinforcement analysis which Kirman employs to explain these 
loyalty relationships could then be said to constitute a summary or exter-
na! representation of the effects of individual decision-making to then be 
further explained in terms of whether individuals adopt shared goals and 
express shared we-intentions regarding continuing transactions. 15 
Note that Kirman explains complexity somewhat differently than this 
when he says that the relationship between individuals and markets is 
complex in virtue of the way in which the latter's organization media tes 
and complica tes the way individuals relate to one another to produce the 
outcomes that explain the aggregate leve! of the market. The view of com-
plex behavior above, however, is actually quite similar to what is sugges-
ted in the previous paragraph. Joint commitments, of course, are a form 
U. Also note that in contrast to Kim1on's an;tlysis which sets out to explnin hu\\· simple m les generate a ll"otr· 
ning process which m~uches certain lmyers and sellers. the o1rgument here puts this dynJmic emphusis uside 
to characterize loyahy :ts .m omcome. howe\·er ;Jchie\'ed. 
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of aggregative behavior. So just as for Kirman market behavior compli-
cares and mediares individual behavior, joint commitment behavior as 
deontologically rational complicares and mediares instrumentally rutio-
nal individual behavior. Collective intentionality analysis, however, brings 
an emphasis to this understanding of complexity that it seems should not 
be overlooked, namely, its individualist character. Whereas the juxtapo· 
sing of individuals and aggregative relationships that markets reflect sug-
gests a juxtaposing of individualist and holist ontologies, collective 
intentionality analysis, as noted above, puts the social into the individual 
vía the way in which we-intentions operute. lt is consequently fully indi-
vidualist in nature- so ontologicully more simple- while ut the same suf-
ficient to explain complexity for individuals in social settings. But this 
leaves the question of whether the conception of the individual in net-
work theory is itself viable in terms of satisfying basic identity require-
ments appropriate to think.ing about individuals. I turn to this issue in 
the following section. 
N. Individuation and re-identification of inter-
active individuals 
First, then, supposing that individuals who develop loyalties to one ano· 
ther in networks and concentrated exchange form joint commitments 
understood in collective intentionality terms, can those individuuls still 
be seen to be distinct and independent from one another - thus satis-
fying the individuation test? Applying the individuation test to the concep-
tion of individuals in networks now understood in the collective 
intentionality terms is a mutter of usk.ing whether such individuuls using 
'we' lunguage somehow distinguish themselves from one another in the 
process of doing so. I huve urgued more generally thut 'sociully embed-
ded individuals' can be understood to distinguish themselves as inde-
pendent individuals if one attends to the way in which they interact with 
others in the process of using 'we' lunguuge, und I essentially summarize 
that urgument here [Davis (2003c), ch. 7]. When individuals form joint 
commitments, und use 'we' language in doing so, they bind themselves 
to whutever they believe others take to be implied by the use of that lan-
guuge. At the same time, it should be emphasized, they bind themselves 
to such implicutions voluntarily, since their use of thut lunguage is inten-
tionul, und one cannot suy that something that is intentional is involun-
tary. This combination of bindingness and voluntariness, then, might be 
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said to involve individuals 'self-imposing' u pon themselves whatever their 
collective intentions imply. Only an individual can 'self-impose' some-
thing upon himself or herself. Others cannot 'self-impose' on another 
individual, but can only 'impose' upon an individual, and then in a mun-
ner contrary to that individual's intentions. Thus the use of \ve' languuge 
involves individuals being both 'sociully embedded' in networks and yet 
also being distinct vis-a-vis others at one and the same time. That is, loyal 
individuals who are linked together in networks are npnetheless inde-
pendent and distinct individuals, and moreover are so specifically in vir-
tue of their relationships to others to whom they are loyal. 
This conclusion is consistent with the general framework developed in 
the first section above as being uppropriate for understanding agent iden-
tity in economics, numely, the fixed-point framework of equilibrium 
proofs in economics. That is, just as fixed-point proofs depend on the 
idea of there being one self-identical or retlexive relutionship to demons-
trate the existence of equilibrium, so here also the existence of (distinct) 
individuals depends u pon there being one self-identical or reflexive rela-
tionship that individuals possess. Or, along with all the relationships indi-
viduals have to others, there is also that unique relationship individuuls 
have to themselves in their being uble to 'self-impose' joint commitments 
upon themselves in the use of \ve' language in interaction with others. 
This unique relationship accordingly explains individual existen ce essen-
tially on the same model as fixed-point theorems explain equilibrium 
existence. 
Second, then, can individuals in networks understood in this way to 
be distinct and independent from one another also be thought to be re-
identifiable as such through a process of change- thus satisfying the re-
identification test? Kirman's evidence from the Marseille fish market 
covers a period of three anda half years, and it is fair to ask whether indi-
viduals who are distinct and independent in virtue of their ability to form 
loyalty relationships to one another eventually lose their distinctness over 
time. as they perhaps become 'oversocialized' [Granovetter (1985)] or 
hubituated to these sorts of ties. Does loyalty, that is. ultimately become 
habitual, consequently submersing individuals in the bonds they form to 
others? Note that according to Kirman's evidence at any one time not all 
buyers and sellers enter into loyalty relutionships. but sorne rather shop 
around. and behave in un instrumentully rational way, so that there are 
always two classes of individuals, loyal traders and 'free' traders. 
Moreover, while the network conception requires that relative sizes of 
the two classes of individuals in the Marseille fish market remain relati-
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vely the same over time, this does not imply that the memberships of 
these two classes remains constant over time. All individuals, we might 
then suppose, not only actas loyal traders on sorne occasions, but also as 
'free' traders on other occasions. Further, it also makes sense to suppose 
that individuals in the capacity of loyal traders might vary the trading 
particular partners to whom they are loyal, if not perhaps as frequently 
as 'free' traders change their trading partners. 
What this all suggests is that in markets in which loyalty networks deve-
lop individuals need not necessarily become habituated to trading with 
always the same individuals. To the contrary, variability in the member-
ship of the two classes and in loyalty relationships themselves would seem 
to involve individuals needing to continually re-learn or re-establish the 
conditions of loyal trade. That is, individuals would only have the sense 
that they are 'self-imposing' their shared commitments upon themselves 
if they were continually able to perceive loyalty as a departure from the 
'free' trade case. This, however, is just what is required for us to be able 
to say that individuals are re-identifiable in terms of what makes them 
distinct individuals - namely this capacity for imposing commitments 
upon oneself- and thus that the network conception of the interactive 
individual meets the re-identification test. In terms of the pairwise for-
mulation which Kirman investigares - and for which Gilbert explains 
shared intentions - individuals who rely on loyalty relationships in trade 
are distinct and re-identifiable through change in the varying pattern of 
those relationships. 
V. Individual identity and equilibrium as 
conjoint properties of economic systems 
Section one above noted the parallel structure of personal identity argu-
ments and fixed point proofs of equilibrium existen ce. T aking personal 
identity arguments to be existence proofs for individuals, it thus seems 
reasonable to suppose that adequate analysis of an economic system ought 
to explain existence of equilibrium and individuals as simultaneously 
obtaining. Or, an economic system should not be thought to be in equili-
brium if existence can be attributed to the system as a whole while it can-
not be attributed to the individuals who occupy it. Recall that the 1970s 
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results, or SMD theory, bring standard 
economics' methodological individualist microfoundations approach into 
question by demonstrating that a pre-given conception of the individual 
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as an atomistic being renders aggregate excess dcmands arbitrary. lt is 
also argued in Davis (2003b) that this same pre-given conception of the 
individual does not satisfy an identity test evaluation needed to attribute 
existence to individuals on that conception. Thus from both vantage points 
the standard view of the individual is problematic beca use of its attach-
ment to a questionable conception of the individual. 
Network theory rather begins by explaining individual and aggregate 
behavior as mutually influencing, and thereby abandons the notion that 
individuals can be explained in a pre-given way apart from their interac-
tion with one another. Put differently, it gives up the notion that one can 
develop aggregative relationships out of individualist microfoundations, 
and rather seeks to explain economic systems in terms of mutually consis-
tent conceptions of the individual and the market. The collective intentio-
nality interpretation in this paper of loyalty relationships in Kirman's 
Marseille fish market case thus treats individual and market as consistent 
with one another by explicitly making the economy's 'microfoundations' 
social-individual, where this is a marter of incorporaring social dimensions 
in individual behavior. Aggregate econonúc behavior, as seen in the stabi-
lity of a large share of the market being carried out by loyal buyers and sel-
lers, is then explained in terms of an underlying social-individual economic 
behavior, as seen in individuals repeatedly forming joint commitments to 
one another as buyers and sellers. Thus equilibrium existence and indivi-
dual existence simultaneously obtain, and are mutually influencing. 
This paper began with a skeptical question: if there is not a way for us 
to understand how individuals retain a status as distinct agents, might it 
not be better that economics regard social groups as economic agents, 
and give up its long-standing attention to individuals? The answer to this 
question can now be seen to be negative, since on the view that indivi-
dual and aggregate behavior are mutually influencing, a comprehensive 
explanaion of an economic system still requires an explanation of indivi-
dual behavior, albeit one different than employed in the standard view of 
the individual in economics. 
In dosing, note that the discussion in this paper does not explain the 
mutual influence of individuals a~d markets or aggregative behavior u pon 
one another dynamically or in terms of it comes about, but rather only as 
an outcome. lt is fair to say, however, that the pathways individuals fol-
low to loyalty rdationships are also important for understanding the nature 
of those relationships. Thus, since an important emphasis in network 
theory generally is on seeing economies as complex adaptive systems in 
which indivi.duals undergo a series of adjustments to arrive at certain out-
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comes, a further development of the analysis here could be thought to 
involve developing an explanation of how individuals Icarn to form joint 
commitments to trade with specific partners, to whom they are then loyal. 
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Résumé 
Une approche particuliere de l'analyse des économies vu~s comme des 
systemes complexes étudie l'interaction entre les individus dans des 
réseaux locaux ou de voisinage qui sont un sous-ensemble des écono-
mies plus larges. En rejetant la vision traditionnelle des fondations microé-
conomiques de la relation entre le comportement économique individue! 
et agrégé, les approches des réseaux expliquent le comportement indivi-
due! et agrégé comme s'influen~ant réciproquement. Ce papier étudie la 
conception des réseaux de l'individu interactif utilisée dans l'analyse 
d' Alan Kirman (200 1) dans le cadre de relations de loyauté entre les ache-
teurs et les vendeurs sur le marché aux poissons de Marseille, en utilisant 
le cadre du test d'identité que j'ui appliqué précédemment a la concep-
tion atomistique standard de l'individu [Davis (2003c)]. Pour ce faire, le 
papier interprete l'individu interactif dans les termes de l'analyse de l'in-
tention collecúve et d'engagements communs te! qu'ils ont été considé-
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rés par Margaret Gilbert. ll donne alors en premier lieu une explication 
sur la form¡¡tion par les acheteurs et vendeurs d'engagements communs, 
tout restant quand meme des individus distincts, et, deuxiemement, argu-
mente qu'a travers le temps les individus ainsi compris peuveryt égale-
ment etre reidentifiés comme des etre distincts. Le papier montre ainsi 
que le cadre d'analyse des réseaux présente une approche pertinente des 
individus compris en termes de relations sociales qui émergent au travers 
d'engagements communs. 
Mots-clés : systemes économiques complexes, réseaux locaux, concep-
tion interactive de l'individu, marché de poissons de Marseille, loyauté, 
test d'identité, engagement commun. 
Abstract 
One approach to the analysis of economies as complex systems investi-
gares interaction between individuals in local networks or neighborhoods 
that are subsets of larger economies. Rejecting the traditional microfoun-
dations view of the relation between individual and aggregate economic 
behavior, network approaches explain individual and aggregate behavior 
as mutually influencing. This paper investigares the network conception 
of the interactive individual as employed in Alan Kirman's (2001) analy-
sis of loyalty relationships between buyers and sellers in the Marseille fish 
market using the identity test framework I previously applied to the stan-
dard atomistic conception of the individual [Davis (2003c)]. To do so, 
the paper interprets the interactive individual in terms of collective inten-
tionality analysis and joint commitments, as understood by Margaret 
Gilbert. It then, first, gives an explanation of how buyers and sellers can 
form joint commitments and yet still remain distinct individuals, and, 
second, argues that over time individuals thus understood can also be re-
identified as distinct individuals. The paper thus presents the network 
framework as offering a viable account of individuals understood in terms 
of social relationships that emerge out of joint commitments. 
Key Words: complex economic systems, local networks, interactive indi-
vidual conception, Marseille fish market, loyalty, identity tests, collcctive 
intentionality, joint commitments. 
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